The Industrial Court has dismissed an urgent application by the Royal Science and Technology Park (RSTP) seeking the return of a company vehicle from its former chief executive officer.
The court ruled that the matter should instead be referred to the Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration Commission (CMAC) due to unresolved disputes of fact.
The matter cited the RSTP versus former CEO Vumile Dlamini and others involved RSTP as the applicant, with former employee Dlamini as the first respondent, the national commissioner of the police as the second respondent and the attorney general as the third respondent.
RSTP had approached the court on an urgent basis seeking an order compelling Dlamini to surrender a Mercedes-Benz motor vehicle, registration number JSD 669 CH which it claimed belonged to the organisation.
The entity further sought assistance from the police to retrieve the vehicle and requested costs against the first respondent.
Dlamini opposed the application and raised several preliminary legal points, including the applicant’s failure to report the dispute in terms of Part VIII of the Industrial Relations Act, the absence of properly pleaded requirements for an interdict, reliance on inadmissible hearsay evidence and the use of motion proceedings despite foreseeable disputes of fact.
The court heard arguments on both the preliminary points and the merits but emphasised that the success of the preliminary objections would render it unnecessary to determine the substantive issues.
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According to the court record, the dispute stems from an employment relationship between RSTP and Dlamini spanning nearly a decade. Dlamini was employed on a fixed-term contract initially running from August 1, 2015, to July 31, 2018. The contract was subsequently renewed twice, first until July 31, 2021 and then until July 31, 2024.
As part of his employment package as chief executive officer, Dlamini was entitled to the use of a company vehicle.
He further submitted that there was a dispute over whether the vehicle was a pool car or assigned specifically to him as part of his remuneration package.
In support of his argument, Dlamini cited case law emphasising that the Industrial Court generally does not entertain disputes that have not undergone the conciliation process prescribed under Part VIII of the Industrial Relations Act.
The court agreed with Dlamini’s submissions, noting that there was a plethora of cases supporting the principle that applications brought in the face of known or foreseeable disputes of fact are liable to be dismissed.
Judge Dlamini-Ng’andu found that the disputes raised in the matter were material and could not be resolved without the leading of oral evidence.
These included disagreements over the applicability of the relevant circulars, the nature of the vehicle benefit, and the existence of any legitimate expectation on the part of the respondent.
“The proper forum would have been to report the matter to CMAC in terms of Part VIII of the Industrial Relations Act,” the court held, adding that such disputes must first be conciliated before they can be escalated to the Industrial Court if unresolved.
The court further observed that failure to refer the matter to CMAC and the existence of foreseeable disputes of fact were closely linked and both justified the dismissal of the application.
As a result, the court upheld the preliminary points in limine and declined to consider the remaining objections or the merits of the case.
“The application is dismissed and the matter is referred to CMAC for resolution,” the court ruled, ordering that each party bear its own costs.
